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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework of corporate political performance (CPP) in corporate political activity. In fact, CPP refers to political benefits obtained by firms when they formulate and...
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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework of corporate political performance (CPP) in corporate political activity. In fact, CPP refers to political benefits obtained by firms when they formulate and implement political strategies to influence the public policy process though the investment of political resources. This paper focuses on answering what is perhaps the most fundamental question to strategy researchers: "How do firms engage in political strategies to improve their performance?" Design/methodology/approach - In building a theoretical framework, this paper, first, provides a historical analysis of political efficiency and effectiveness. Then, this paper attempts to illustrate conceptually our understanding of political performance process by a generalized and contingent approach. Finally, this paper discusses the framework, its theoretical contribution and practical implications for Chinese management, and comments on limitations for future research. Findings - The paper presents a conceptual CPP model that integrates political efficiency and effectiveness approach. In the conceptual framework, three phases of CPP include sources of political advantage, political competitive advantage and political performance outcome, and three dimensions are identified as political efficiency, effectiveness and adaptiveness. CPP approach is not a "generalized" nature of political performance measurement, as the difference among firms and industries in this area may be significant, which reflects the effect of context, reaction and outcome factors. Research limitations/implications - While it provides a strong theoretical foundation, this paper still has almost little empirical evidence concerning CPP process. However, how to measure CPP has increasingly begun to focus on an important research domain in corporate political strategy literature. This paper believes that this model has a need for future research to test its feasibility by using the measurement scales in Chinese context. Originality/value - This paper is original in its attempt to measure CPP to help the business practice in corporate of political activity, and broaden corporate political strategy research in mainstream strategic management.
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Shifting political interests of government officials stemming from the Provincial Party Congress (PPC) affects the efficiency of urban innovation. In this paper, intra-city collaborative innovation efficiency (CIE) and inter-city ...
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Shifting political interests of government officials stemming from the Provincial Party Congress (PPC) affects the efficiency of urban innovation. In this paper, intra-city collaborative innovation efficiency (CIE) and inter-city CIE were both analyzed. The intra-city CIE among 285 Chinese cities from 2004 to 2018 was estimated using network data envelopment analysis model, with a gravity model utilized to measure inter-city CIE. Based on a fixed-effect model, the relationship between estimated change in CIE and political cycle is revealed from the perspective of PPC. The study finds that across all cities, (1) cyclical fluctuations in CIE synchronize with the timing of PPC. The inter-city CIE is more sensitive to political cycles than that of intra-city. (2) The turnover effect of PPC cannot be equated with leadership transition alone at non-PPC years. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis identified differential effects of features of government officials and cities on political cycles of urban CIE.
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We examine the impact of political uncertainty on the labour investment efficiency (LIE) of a firm. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we test the market discipline and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Our findings suggest that p...
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We examine the impact of political uncertainty on the labour investment efficiency (LIE) of a firm. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we test the market discipline and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Our findings suggest that political uncertainty adversely affects LIE. The results are consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. That is, firms hire more labour in a period of increased information asymmetry due to the political uncertainty, which deteriorates LIE. Our findings are robust to a battery of alternative measures of LIE and estimation methods. We conduct several additional analyses and document that the adverse impact of political uncertainty is stronger when the newly appointed government official is older, the firm is state-owned, the firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry or the firm operates in locations with stringent labour protection. By contrast, when the firm locates in a region with weak Chinese government intervention or after President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, the adverse impact of political uncertainty on LIE is less pronounced. Last, we document that after hiring more labour, firms receive tangible and intangible benefits in terms of receiving more loans, collect more government subsidies, and able to re-establish some political connection but at the cost of lower performance.
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While scholars of urban policy have relied on economic theories of transaction cost inexamining local service delivery, less attention has been paid to the role of political transactioncosts in local service production choices and...
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While scholars of urban policy have relied on economic theories of transaction cost inexamining local service delivery, less attention has been paid to the role of political transactioncosts in local service production choices and changes. Based on a transaction cost politicsperspective, this research investigates how city governments' selection of service production isinfluenced by political actors' calculation of political efficacy. Empirical analysis lends supportfor the idea that the choice of service production arrangements is an outcome of interactionamong four political actors - elected officials, managers, line employees, and constituents -who each strategically promote their self-interested career goals in the political process.Controlling for service characteristics, community characteristics, and market size, evidencereveals that changes in service production arrangements are influenced by political andadministrative institutions as well the economic situations of citizens.
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This study investigates the impact of political connections on firm efficiency as well as its mechanisms in Chinese renewable energy firms. The empirical results reveal a direct negative association between political connections a...
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This study investigates the impact of political connections on firm efficiency as well as its mechanisms in Chinese renewable energy firms. The empirical results reveal a direct negative association between political connections and firm efficiency and an indirect correlation through political resources. The results indicate that the higher the level of political connections, the stronger the relationship between political connections and firm efficiency. Our findings also indicate that the impact of political connections is different between state-owned and non-state-owned firms. For state-owned firms, political connections are negatively correlated with firm efficiency and government subsidies are not beneficial for state-owned firms in promoting productivity. As for non-state-owned firms, there is a 'double-edged sword' effect of political connections on firm efficiency. On the one hand, political connections are associated with lower firm efficiency, but on the other hand, political connections can alleviate the adverse effects of financing constraints on non-state-owned firms. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The present paper starts by discussing the principles of public funding of universities. The size of the social returns to investment in education gives an indication regarding the most efficient use of resources, while the differ...
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The present paper starts by discussing the principles of public funding of universities. The size of the social returns to investment in education gives an indication regarding the most efficient use of resources, while the difference between the private and the social rates relates to issues of equity. The available evidence is contrasted to higher education funding policies in several countries. It is concluded that there is a divide between the research findings regarding efficient and equitable financing, and the actual public funding of universities. The reasons for this divide are discussed in the context of political economy, rent-seeking by several stakeholders and, above all, vote-seeking by politicians.
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In this paper we seek a robust methodology for the measurement of the relative public sector efficiency of 19 OECD countries over the period 1980-2000. We estimate relative efficiency scores for five disaggregated accounts of publ...
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In this paper we seek a robust methodology for the measurement of the relative public sector efficiency of 19 OECD countries over the period 1980-2000. We estimate relative efficiency scores for five disaggregated accounts of public spending as well as for aggregate public spending. Then, we use a semi-parametric econometric method to isolate the impact of government inefficiency from the inefficiency arising from the socioeconomic environment and luck. To verify the validity of our index, we use it to examine a number of well-established relationships in the public choice literature, which have only been tested using local government data.
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This paper investigates the impact of political connections on firm operational efficiencies. We test the political interventions in investment and employment decisions. Our results provide strong support for the presence of inves...
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This paper investigates the impact of political connections on firm operational efficiencies. We test the political interventions in investment and employment decisions. Our results provide strong support for the presence of investment inefficiencies and excessive employment amongst politically connected firms, whereas the detrimental effect of political interventions is substantially larger on employment decisions. We further find that such operational inefficiencies are more pronounced for low-growth connected firms. Finally, the economy-wide cost of the excessive employments is estimated to be 0.19 % of GDP annually.
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We argue in this paper that firms with foreign operations misallocate capital and underperform when they face political instability abroad. We develop and test a dynamic model of firm capital allocation under foreign political ins...
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We argue in this paper that firms with foreign operations misallocate capital and underperform when they face political instability abroad. We develop and test a dynamic model of firm capital allocation under foreign political instability. The model shows that as a political regime becomes less stable, independent of whether the regime becomes less business-friendly or more business-friendly, firms invest suboptimally (i.e., they either overinvest or underinvest), and their marginal q's diverge further from an optimal level. Using elections and textual analysis of local media during national elections, we construct a novel index of political instability. We find that U.S. firms and industries with a greater exposure to election-induced political instability experience disruptions of investment efficiency that lead to lower valuations and lower total factor productivity. Therefore, international trade is a significant conduit of foreign political instability into U.S. markets.
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There is little research studying the effects of political violence on financial markets over decades, especially in an atmosphere where the violence manifested itself in heterogeneous and geographically widespread ways. This arti...
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There is little research studying the effects of political violence on financial markets over decades, especially in an atmosphere where the violence manifested itself in heterogeneous and geographically widespread ways. This article examines the authoritarian edifice of Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century to examine the way in which capital markets perceived political instability in a country which had paradoxically strong financial institutions but weak political ones. Using a novel database on political violence in Russia in the nineteenth century matched to monthly financial data from Russian equity markets, this article provides strong evidence that Russia's financial markets were negatively affected in the long run by political violence. Consistent with modern views of financial information, the effects of political violence were quickly incorporated into asset prices, but the specific magnitude of such violence was different depending on where the violence occurred and in what manner. Overall, it appeared that political violence was perceived very negatively by investors in Russian equity markets.
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